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Introduction
As the United Nations nears the end of its third decade, the influence of the
United States appears to be on the wane. Nowhere is this more apparent than in
the recent debates on the issue of international terrorism. The inability or
unwillingness of the United States to acknowledge and to come to grips with
the reasoning of many so-called "Third World" nations regarding this issue,
was a significant factor in the United Nations' failure to take any positive steps
toward the resolution of terrorism during the 27th Session. This note examines
those debates.t
Since the late sixties, scarcely a week has gone by without the appearance of
press accounts, describing some shocking new act of international "terrorism, "1
against international civil aviation, 2 diplomatic personnel 3 or unarmed
*J.D., Georgetown University Law School (1973).
tThis paper was the winner of the 1973 Henry C. Morris International Law Contest.
tSince this article was written, the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism has presented
its report to the United Nations General Assembly after holding some two dozen meetings between
July 16, 1973, and August 11, 1973. See 28 GAOR, Supp. 28, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973).
Sub-committees on the definition, underlying causes, and prevention of terrorism failed to produce
any concrete proposals, and the debate reflected the positions advocated by the various states in the
1972 Sixth (Legal) Committee proceedings. At its 2197th plenary meeting, on December 12,
1973, the General Assembly adopted the recommendation of the Sixth (Legal) Committee to include
the matter of international terrorism in the 1974 agenda. No other action was taken by the United
Nations on this subject.
'Not surprisingly, the precise meaning of this term is a matter of considerable debate among
scholars and diplomats concerned with the problem of "terrorism" for very important political
reasons. See text infra at notes 46-54. In general, terrorism includes any actions by which the
achievement of aims is sought through the systematic use of violence. But recent contemporary
usage tends to restrict its meaning to either random or extortionate violence, aimed ultimately at the
target state of a guerrilla, resistance or liberation movement but which strikes at unarmed civilians,
diplomats or non-combatants. See, e.g., Article 1 of the United States Draft Convention, note 18
infra. The element of "terror" itself seems to be optional or, at least, incidental to a definition of
terrorism, although the Terrorism Convention of 1937, note 40 infra, did make it a central part of
its definition. The study of terrorism prepared by the United Nations Secretariat, note 32 infra,
suggests that "the act must be such as to spread terror or alarm among a given population, or
among broad groups of people." Id. at 6.
2During the first nine months of 1972, 25 airliners from 13 countries were successfully hijacked,
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civilians 4-perpetrated ostensibly by guerrilla movements from Latin
America, 5 southern Africa6 or the Mideast. 7
and 26 other attempts were frustrated. In the same period, 140 airline passengers and crew were
killed and 97 wounded in acts of terrorism. Address by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, United
Nations General Assembly, September 25, 1972, Press Release USUN-104 (72) at 7. From January
1, 1948, to July 1, 1971, there were 89 successful hijackings originating in the United States and 115
originating in other countries. See Evans, A Proposed Method of Control, 37 J. AIR L. & CoM. 171,
172 n.5 (1971). See generally, Hearings onAircraft Hijackings Before the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
'In the past five years prior to 1973, 27 diplomats from 11 countries have been kidnapped and
three assassinated. Address of Secretary of State William P. Rogers, United Nations General
Assembly, September 25, 1972, Press Release USUN-104(72) at 7. Some of the better known
examples are the murder of West German Ambassador Karl von Spreti by urban guerrillas in
Guatemala, N.Y. Times, April 6, 1970, at 1, col. 6, and the murder of Israeli Consul-General
Ephraim Elrom by the Turkish People's Liberation Army, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
In late 1970, a group of French-Canadian separatists kidnapped and murdered Pierre Laporte, the
Minister of Labor and Immigration of Quebec. See G. MoRT, TERROR IN QUEBEC: CASE STUDIES
OF THE FLO (Toronto, 1970). See also Hayter, Politics of Kidnapping, 4 INTERPLAY 14 (1971).
'Late in 1972, a rash of "letter-bombs" appeared throughout the world injuring or killing postal
employees, secretaries, airport personnel and diplomats. Letter-bombs were posted into
international mail channels from Amsterdam and New Delhi, from Belgrade and Singapore, from
Bombay and Malaysia to a world-wide list of addresses in Canada, Austria, Argentina, the United
Kingdom, Australia, Egypt, Brazil, Libya, Cambodia, Italy, Jordan, the United States and West
Germany. Address of Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Sixth (Legal) Committee of the United
Nations, November 13, 1972, Press Release USUN-134(72) at 2.
'For an introduction to the various guerilla movements in Latin America, see Trebat, Internal
Violence and the International System: The Experience in Latin America, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW.
308(1971). See generally J. MALLIN, TERROR AND URBAN GUERRILLAS (1971); L. MERCIER VEGA,
GUERRILLAS IN LATIN AMERICA: THE TECHNIQUE OF THE COUNTER STATE (1969); Mallin,
Terrorism as a Political Weapon, 22 AIR UNIV. REV. 45 (July-August 1971); Russell & Hildner,
Urban Insurgency in Latin America: Its Implications for the Future, 22 AIR UNIV. REv. 54
(Sept.-Oct. 1971). Two newspaper articles are particularly helpful, Simons, Mexico Guerrillas
Preach Revolt, Practice Irritation, The Washington Post, May11, 1973, at A28, col.1; de Gramont,
How One Pleasant, Scholarly Young Manfrom Brazil Became a Kidnapping, Gun-toting, Bombing
Revolutionary, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1970, (Magazine), at 43.
'A useful introduction to the several liberation groups operating in the Portuguese colonies of
Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau can be found in Howe, War in Southern Africa, 48 FOR.
AFF. 150 (1969). Most longer treatments of terrorism in southern Africa are written by South
Africans or Rhodesians or Portuguese and bear a recognizable bias. See M. HORRELL, TERRORISM
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (Johannesburg, 1968); M. MORRIS, TERRORISM: THE FIRST FULL ACCOUNT
IN DETAIL OF TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (Capetown, 1971); R. SHAY,
THE SILENT WAR (Salisbury, 1971); B. TEIXERA, THE FABRIC OF TERROR: THREE DAYS IN
ANGOLA (1965); A. VENTER, THE TERROR FIGHTERS: A PROFILE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA (Capetown, 1969). A recent newspaper account captures the current mood of
this generally unnoticed area of conflict, Mohr, Whites' Fear of Black Rebels Spreading in
Rhodesia, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1973, at 1, col. 2, which is considered a major confrontation by
many of the black African states attending the current meetings of the Organization of African
Unity. The Washington Post, May 19, 1973, at A19, col. 8.
7The Arab-Israeli conflict has, since the 1940s, been the subject of an enormous amount of
journalistic, scholarly, and governmental study, which-as might be expected-has served more to
obscure than to clarify the factual picture. The most recent effort to describe the Palestinian
movement is unfortunately a victim of the author's inarticulateness, but may be helpful. See D.
PRYCE-JONES, THE FACE OF DEFEAT: PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND GUERRILLAS (1972). Press
accounts have devoted much of their space to attempts to identify who is who in the guerrilla
infrastructure, and to some extent succeed in lifting some of the mystery from the so-called "Black
September" terrorist organization. See NEWSWEEK, March 19, 1973, at 42; 216 NATION 356 (March
19, 1973); The Washington Post, March 15, 1973, at Al, col. 7; The Washington Post, May 17,
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The unprecedented slaughter of 26 innocent tourists at Lod Airport in Tel
Aviv in May 1972,8 the murder of 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in
September 1972, 9 and the killing of three American and Belgian diplomats in
Khartoum in March 197310 are only the most recent and well-publicized
examples of this disheartening trend which cries out for reversal.
The United States-as one of the states most victimized by the
terrorists 11 -has understandably been outraged, and has taken an aggressive
lead in seeking international control of this sort of ignoble activity. With
vigorous United States support, the three I.C.A.O. -sponsored hijacking
conventions-the Tokyo Convention, 12 the Hague Convention,13 and the
Montreal Convention l4-have now entered into effect, and the
O.A.S.-sponsored convention on the kidnapping of diplomatsl5 is now in the
ratification stage.
In the United Nations, since Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim requested the
inclusion of the issue of terrorism on the agenda of the General Assembly on
1973, at F2, col. I (discussing the status of the Palestinians since Khartoum). For an interesting
historical parallel to the Arab terrorists in Palestine, see the discussion of the Zionist terror groups,
the Stern Group and the Irgun Zvai Leumi, which disbanded after the assassination of the United
Nations mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, in R. GAUCHER, THE TERRORISTS: FROM
TSARIST RUSSIA TO THE O.A.S. (London, 1968).
'N.Y. Times, May 31, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
'N.Y. Times, September 6, 1972, at 1, col. 8. Three of the participants in the Munich episode
were subsequently released by the West German government after other Black Septemberists
hijacked a Lufthansa jetliner. N.Y. Times, October 30, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
"The Washington Post, March 9, 1973, at Al, col. 3. The diplomats-Ambassador Cleo A. Noel,
Jr., George C. Moore, and Belgian diplomat Guy Eid-were seized in an effort to free 17 Palestinian
guerrillas held in Jordan. The prisoners were not released and the diplomats were executed. Time,
March 19, 1973, at 26.
"See note 2 supra; Note, Terrorist Kidnapping of Diplomatic Personnel, 5 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
289, 204 n.70 (1972).
"Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo
on September 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. 6768. This treaty did not enter into effect until
1969, after the requisite number of ratifications was obtained. It relates primarily to the return of
hijacked airliners. See Boyle & Pulsifer, The Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain OtherActs
Committed on Board Aircraft, 30 J. AIR L. & COMM. 305 (1964); Samuels, Crimes Committed on
Board Aircraft: The Tokyo Convention, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 271 (1967).
"Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the Hague on
December 16, 1970, 10 Int'l Leg. Mat. 133 (1971), 64 DEP'T STATE BULL. 50 (1971), T.I.A.S. 7192.
See generally AERIAL PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (McWhinney, ed. 1971); Mankiewicz, The
1970 Hague Convention, 37 J. AIR L. & COMM. 195 (1971); Jacobson, From Piracy on the High Seas
to Piracy in the High Skies: A Study of Aircraft Hijacking, 5 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 161, 177 et seq.
(1972).
"Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at
Montreal on September 23, 1971,-.U.S.T.__, T.I.A.S. 7570. See Thomas and Kirby, The
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 22 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 163 (1973).
"Convention to Prevent and Punish-the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against
Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, signed at Washington on
February 2, 1971, O.A.S. Doc. AG/88 Rev. 1, 64, DEP'T STATE BULL. 228 (1971). See Note, The
Inter-American Convention on the Kidnapping of Diplomats, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 392
(1971).
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September 8, 1973,16 the United States has been particularly outspoken in
urging the adoption of both an international convention to protect diplomats
specifically,17 and one to protect nationals of neutral states more generally from
terrorist attacks.18
Despite these strenuous efforts, however, the kidnapping of diplomats1 9 and
hijacking of aircraft 20 goes on, and, from the tone of debates in the last session
of the United Nations, it appears that a substantial majority of states do not
accept the United States' approach to the subject. 21 This difference of opinion
is so significant that it threatens to impede any further steps to limit the use of
violence in an all-too-violent world, and must be closely examined.
As originally proposed by the Secretary-General, the issue of terrorist deeds
6U.N. Doc. A/8791/ Add. 1 (1972). "The Secretary-General considers that the current trends
towards terrorism and senseless violence is so alarming and has such grave implications that it
should be considered by the General Assembly, with the hope that agreed measures can be found
which will help to reverse this trend and prevent such tragedies in the future." Id. at 2.
'Statement by Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General
Assembly, October 2, 1972, Press Release USUN-112(72). The International Law Commission
submitted Draft Articles on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Diplomatic Agents
and Other Internationally Protected Persons, in its annual report, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 10 at 88,
U.N. Doc. A/8710/Rev.1 (1973). The Sixth (Legal) Committee recommended soliciting comments
from Member States, U.N. Doc. A/8892 (1972) at 73, and the General Assembly approved this
recommendation, including the draft convention on the agenda for the 28th Session. G.A. Res.
2926 (XXVII) (November 28, 1972).
'Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International
Terrorism, Circulated in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the United Nations, September 25, 1972.
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.85 (1972). See Statement by Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Sixth (Legal)
Committee of the United Nations, September 25. 1972, Press Release USUN-105(72); Address by
John Norton Moore, Counselor on International Law, Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of
State, at the American Society of International Law, 67th Annual Meeting, April 12, 1973. This
convention would require either extradition or prosecution of anyone who is apprehended after
killing, injuring, or kidnapping another person if, within the meaning of Article 1(a) the offense
occurs outside the State of which the offender is a national; (b) occurs outside the territory of the
State against which the act is directed or within such territory but is committed against a person who
is not a national of such State; (c) is not committed by a member of the armed services in the course
of hostilities; and (d) is intended to damage the interests of, or obtain concessions from, a State or
international organization. No action was taken on this draft convention in the 27th Session of the
United Nations.
"The United States Consul-General in Guadalajara, Mexico, Terrence G, Leonhardy was
kidnapped and held hostage until 30 political prisoners were released into the custody of the Cuban
government, certain political press releases regarding poverty in Mexico were printed by
newspapers, and $80,000 in ransom was paid to the guerrilla terrorists. The Washington Post, May
6, 1973, at Al, col. 5; id., May 7, 1973, at Al, col. 1; id., May 9, 1973, at Al, col. 1.
2OA Venezuelan airliner carrying 42 passengers was hijacked by guerrillas demanding the release
of 79 political prisoners held by the Venezuelan government. Despite threats to blow up the plane,
the demands were not met and the terrorists ultimately flew the plane to Cuba where they
disembarked and allowed the plane to return to Mexico. The Washington Post, May 20, 1973, at
A4, col. 4; id., May 21, 1973, at A19, col. 1.
"See Report of the Chairman of the Sixth Committee on his Consultations with regard to the
Question of International Terrorism, Undertaken in Pursuance of the Decision Taken by the
Committee on September 27, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.866 (November 9, 1972). This preliminary
report noted the reluctance of most members to move precipitously towards any specific convention
which would perhaps be unbalanced in its aims and effects. In the Sixth Committee, the members
voted 76 to 43 with 7 abstentions not to give priority to a United States-sponsored resolution in its
proceedings. Report of the Sixth Committee, U.N. Doc. A/8969 at 13 (December 16, 1972).
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was to have been considered by the United Nations under the title: "Measures to
prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take innocent
human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms." 22 On the sugggestion of
Ambassador Baroody of Saudia Arabia, however, the General Assembly
amended this title to include the significantly revealing phrase:
... and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence
which result in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some
people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical
change. 23
At the debate on the inscription of this item on the agenda, and later during
the Sixth (Legal) Committee and General Assembly debates, the United States
and a minority of other states adamantly but unsuccessfully insisted that the
acts of terrorists were logically and legally separable from the political or social
motivation behind them, and could be legislated against as easily as any
"common" crime. 24 Before the General Assembly, Secretary of State William
Rogers articulated the United States' position as follows:
The issue is not war-war between states, civil war, or revolutionary war. The issue
is not the strivings of people to achieve self-determination and independence....
We are all aware that, aside from the psychotic and the purely felonious, many
criminal acts of terrorism derive from political origins. We all recognize that issues
such as self-determination must continue to be addressed seriously by the
international community. But political passion, however deeply held, cannot be a
justification for criminal violence against innocent persons. 25
Nevertheless, the General Assembly accepted the recommendation of the Sixth
Committee in Resolution 303426 to appoint an ad hoc committee 27 whose task
would be to study both terrorism and its causes, and to make
"recommendations for possible co-operation for the speedy elimination of the
problem, bearing in mind the provisions [which reaffirm the inalienable right to
self-determination]." 28
The United States feels quite strongly that the adoption of Resolution 3034
"U.N. Doc. A/8791/Add.1 (1972).
"U.N. Doc. A/PV (1972); item 92.
"See Statement by Ambassador George Bush, United Nations General Assembly, September 22,
1972 (on the inscription of the item on terrorism), Press Release USUN-98(72); Statement by
Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Sixth Committee of the United Nations, November 13, 1972,
Press Release USUN-134(72); id., December 8, 1972, Press Release USUN-158(72); Statement by
Ambassador George Bush, United Nations General Assembly, December 18, 1972, Press Release
USUN-166(72).
"Address by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, United Nations General Assembly, September
25, 1972, Press Release USUN-104(72).
"U.N. Doc. A/RES/3034 (XXVII) (January 11, 1973).
"The President of the General Assembly, Stanislaw Trepczynski, notified the Secretary General
on April 20, 1973, that he had named the 35 members of the committee, including the United
States. U.N. Doc. A/8993 (April 24, 1973). The membership includes 19 Member States that voted
for Res. 3034; 13 that voted against it; and 3 that abstained.
"U.N. Doc. A/RES/3034 (XXVII) (January 11, 1973) at 2.
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and the failure of the Sixth Committee to take any positive action on its Draft
Convention on Terrorism 29 amount to a tragic mistake, which can only serve to
"weaken the only world-wide mechanism for international cooperation that
exists." 30 To American policy-makers, the causes of terrorism are irrelevant 31
since, as the study prepared by the United Nations Secretariat itself
emphasizes, "the legitimacy of a cause does not in itself legitimize the use of
certain forms of violence, especially against the innocent." 32
But to acknowledge that a just cause can neither justify nor legitimize
terrorism does not mean that a study of such causes is irrelevant. For it may very
well reveal not only that some politically-motivated acts are rooted so deeply in a
dedication to a cause that no sanction can deter them, but also that other acts of
terrorism spring from a frustration of legitimate means, caused in turn by acts
of governmental repression and "terrorism" which it would be anomalous for an
international organization like the United Nations-dedicated to equal rights
and justice33 -to ignore.
To underestimate the significance of either of these possibilities, as the
United States has apparently done, is perhaps a failure of moral perspective, but
more importantly it is a miscalculation in the one area which should be
paramount: the effectiveness of any proposed solution.
In considering the issue of terrorism, one must ultimately face up to the
realities and possibilities of controlling its use. Certainly there are some
unilateral, preventive measures that states may adopt with reasonable expec-
tation of making it more difficult for terrorists to hijack aircraft or to kidnap
diplomats. Elaborate airport security measures in the United States seem to be
the decisive factor in forestalling any domestic hijackings in the period between
"See note 18 supra.
"°Statement of Ambassador George Bush, United Nations General Assembly, December 18,
1972, Press Release USUN-166(72) (in explanation of the United States' vote in opposition to Res.
3034).
"President Richard Nixon has stated:
There are those who would tell us that terror is the last resort of the weak and the oppressed, a
product of despair in an age of indifference, and that it seeks only political justice. This is
nonsense. The way to seek justice is through negotiation. We have sought in our own relations to
turn from confrontation to negotiation. We believe that this is the only way for grievances to be
resolved in a way that will contribute to peace and stability.
Press Release USUN-107(72) (September 27, 1972).
"Study Prepared by the Secretariat in Accordance with the Decision Taken by the Sixth
Committee at its 1314th Meeting on September 27, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/418 (November 2,
1972) at 7. This useful study compiles and comments on all of the major efforts at controlling the
sorts of violence subsumed under the heading of "terrorism" in the past, including the three
hijacking conventions, the OAS convention on the kidnapping of diplomats, and the terrorism
convention of 1937.
"The goals of the United Nations include not only maintaining peace and security, but also
achieving international cooperation "in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
for fundamental freedoms." United Nations Charter, art. 1(3). See also Internation Declaration of
Human Rights, 3 U.N. GAOR, I, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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November 1972 and May 1973.34
Stepped-up intelligence operations and increased protection of United States
diplomats and officials, 35 however, can never be entirely effective, as the recent
kidnapping of a U.S. consul-general in Mexico illustrates. 36 More broadly, it
would be impossible to extend physical protection to the hundreds of thousands
of American citizens and businesses abroad that, like Ford Motor Co. and its
executives in Argentina,37 can be the target of terrorist attack as well.
The inherent limitations of this sort of unilateral effort to control
terrorism-and even unilateral efforts such as the use of illegal, aggressive acts
of retaliation by the Israeli government 38 -has prompted the United States to
initiate a simultaneous effort to push for the adoption of various multilateral
treaties which would require prosecution or extradition of terrorists wherever
apprehended. 39 This international convention approach calls to mind the
14The elaborate search and screening operations, now in effect at all of the United States' 531
airports, apparently is responsible for the drastic reduction in hijackings and attempted hijackings
since November 1972. In the first four months of 1973, there had been no attempts, but 617 persons
were denied permission to board aircraft and 504 unauthorized weapons were seized by Federal
Aviation Administration officers. The Washington Post, May 12, 1973, at A8, col. 2.
"On September 25, 1972, President Nixon named a 10-member Cabinet Committee to Combat
Terrorism, to coordinate United States efforts in this area, which in turn appointed a Working
Group on Terrorism headed by Armin H. Meyer, former Ambassador to Japan. One result of these
groups' efforts has been tighter security for embassies and more aggressive counterintelligence
operations to detect possible kidnap plots. The Washington Post, March 18, 1973, at Al, col. 8.
36See note 19 supra.
"The Ford Motor Company in Argentina agreed to pay more than $1 million to various hospitals
and charities as "protection money" demanded by the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army,
under threat of kidnapping Ford executives. Earlier, one Ford executive had been shot by the
terrorists. The Washington Post, May 29, 1973, at A14, col. 6.
3 On several occasions, the Israeli government has launched retaliatory raids against Palestinian
guerrilla forces camped in neighboring states. Following the Khartoum murders, see note 10 supra,
Israeli soldiers staged a midnight raid against alleged terrorists living in Beirut, Lebanon, killing or
wounding 40 individuals-including several innocent civilians. The Washington Post, April 10,
1973, at Al, col. 5. Subsequently, the United Nations Security Council censured Israel for this
attack by a vote of 11 to 0, with China, Guinea, the Soviet Union, and the United States abstaining.
The Washington Post, April 22, 1973, at Al, col. 8. Although the proscriptions against the use of
armed force except as a direct response to "armed attack" contained in United Nations Charter
Articles 2(4) and 51 seem clearly to apply to this sort of retaliation, some scholars have sought to
stretch the self-defense category to fit the Israeli response to Palestinian terrorism. See Taulbee,
Retaliation and Irregular Warfare in Contemporary International Law, 7 INT'L LAW. 195 (1973).
"See Article 3 in the United States draft convention, note 18 supra, and Article 6 in the
International Law Commission draft articles, note 17 supra. If there were no other objections to
these conventions, there would be substantial and perhaps unresolvable debate over the
requirement of either extraditing or prosecuting. The so-called "political offenses" exception to
extradition treaties as well as the long-recognized Latin American tradition of asylum are not at all
clear in terms of their appropriateness in the circumstance of terrorist activity. See generally
Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offenses Exception in Extradition-A
Proposed Judicial Standard, 19 DEPAuXL L. REV. 217 (1969); Green, Hiacking and the Right of
Asylum, in AERIAL PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 124 (McWhinney, ed. 1971); Nayar, The
Right of Asylum in International Law: Its Status and Prospects, 17 ST. Louis U. L.J. 17 (1972);
Szabo, Political Crimes; A Historical Perspective, 2 DENVER J. INT'L & COMP. L 7(1972); Note,
Hijacking as a Political Crime-Who Should Judge? 2 CALIF. W.L.J. 92 (1971).
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ill-fated Terrorism Convention of 1937 sponsored by the League of Nations 40
which succeeded in attracting only one ratification-that of India.
The three recent conventions on hijacking have obtained substantially more
ratifications,41 but it is yet to be shown that they have had or will have any
positive effect on the basic problem of political terrorism. The convention
approach is of course always limited by the parameters of its acceptability
among nations, and on the issue of terrorism those nations most crucial to
effective measures-the nations that tolerate, support, and harbor the guerrilla
bands from which the the terrorists are drawn 42-find the American initiatives
unacceptable.43 So long as one or more states are willing-for whatever
reason-to play a role like that of Cuba in the recent kidnapping and hijacking
4'Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, opened for signature at Geneva,
November 16, 1937, 7 Hudson Int'l Leg. 862 (1941). See Note, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 214 (1938); see
also the background materials regarding this convention in the study prepared by the Secretariat,
note 32 supra, at 22. The initiative for this convention was sparked primarily by the assassination of
King Alexander of Yugoslavia in 1934.
4'See notes 12-14 supra.
"The relationship between groups which perpetrate specific acts of terrorism and other
revolutionary or guerrilla organizations, operating against the same target but through more
conventional means is frequently unclear. The so-called "Black September" group which has
claimed responsibility for the most outrageous acts in the past year-Lod, Munich and
Khartoum-is apparently an official tool of the Palestinian guerrilla organization, Al Fatah, which
is in turn part of the larger Palestinian Liberation Organization, but for obvious public relations
purposes, both Fatah and PLO deny the links. The Washington Post, April 14, 1973, at A6, col. 1.
The relationship between the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a Marxist group which
claimed credit for several spectacular hijackings in 1971, and the PLO is equally indefinable. D.
PRYCE-JONES, THE FACE OF DEFEAT: PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND GUERRILLAS (1972) at 145. A
number of states give support to guerrilla bands operating against neighboring states waging what
are ostensibly "wars of national liberation." Zambia, for example, has regularly harbored
contingents from various liberation forces operating against Rhodesia, South Africa. and the
Portuguese colonies. See Howe, War in Southern Africa, 48 FOR. AFF. 150 (1969); N.Y. Times,
May 13, 1973, at 1, col. 2. Libya has taken an active role in financing liberation movements
throughout the world as well as in the Mideast, using millions of dollars obtained from oil royalties,
since the coming to power of its fiery, revolutionary leader, Co. Muammar Qaddafi. The Washing-
ton Post, May 20, 1973, at Al, col. 1. In addition to supplying, training and sheltering Palestinian
guerrillas-including apparently the terrorists involved in the Khartoum murders. The Washington
Post, April 8, 1973, at A16, col. 1-Libya has supported Moslem insurgents in the Philippines, The
Washington Post, May 11, 1973, at A20, col. 1, and the outlawed Irish Republican Army in
Northern Ireland, The Washington Post, May 14, 1973, at Al, col. 1.
"Taking as their starting point the frequent reaffirmations by the United Nations of the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514,
15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961), which declares that "All peoples have
the right to self-determination," these states defend the right of "colonial" peoples to wage wars of
national liberation against their oppressors. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2548 (XXIV) of December 11,
1969, on the implementation of Res. 1514; G.A. Res. 2787 (XXVI) of December 6, 1971 on the
same subject. The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations has recently stated that it
"confirms the legality of all peoples' struggle for self-determination and liberation from colonial and
foreign domination by all available means." ESOSOC Res. 1592 of May 21, 1971. The majority of
the states in the United Nations, thus, have apparently endorsed liberation movements, and any
international effort which could be construed as infringing this right can be expected to draw their
opposition. A number of states during the debates on terrorism expressed concern that proposed
conventions such as the United States' could be used or interpreted in such a way as to restrict the
legitimate activities of "freedom fighters." The remarks of Ambassador Diaz Casanueva of Chile
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incidents, 44 or like that of Libya after the Munich Olympics incident45 or,
indeed, like that of Lebanon in relation to the Palestinian movement
generally, 46 those states will not agree to any convention that purports to
impose on them the duty of aut dedere autjudicare.
It is absolutely essential that the United States-if it wishes to achieve a
truly effective system of controls on terrorism-understand and respect the
rationale followed in this matter by the states who have not, and most likely will
not, adhere to any of the present or proposed conventions. To these states, the
United States approach presents an unrelenting "quid" without a "pro quo"
which is either flexible or equitable.
Terrorism, from the point of view of many of the underdeveloped and
emerging nations of the world, is more likely to be employed by governments
than against governments-especially those of totalitarian, 4 7 primitive 4 8 or
are illustrative:
We share the concern of many delegations that it might be possible, given the imprecision and
vagueness of the term, to describe as terrorists the heroic fighters against colonial expropriation
and shameful racism or those who legitimately rebel against oppression, injustice or misery.
[Compilation of Relevant Views Expressed in the Course of the General Debate, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/L.867 (1972).]
"Cuba agreed to accept the 30 political prisoners for whose release the terrorists had kidnapped
U.S. Consul-General Leonhardy in Mexico, see note 19 supra, and granted asylum to the
Venezuelan terrorists who had hijacked an airliner in an unsuccessful attempt to extort the release
of political prisoners, see note 20 supra. The traditional destination of hijackers, Cuba has recently
begun to take steps to be more selective about granting asylum and has signed a "memorandum of
understanding" with the United States, which relates to hijacking and cross-border raids (such as
the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion). The agreement includes a provision for aut dedere autjudicare
with a narrow exception for granting asylum to political offenders. 12 INT'L LEO. MAT. 370 (1973),
67 DEPT. STATE BULL. 260 (1973). The return to power of the Peronists in Argentina, and the
resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries, seems to herald an increasing mood
of detente between Cuba and OAS Member States, which may reduce Cuba's role in supporting
guerrilla movements. The Washington Post, May 29, 1973, at Al, col. 6.
"Libya gave what amounted to a heroes' welcome to the three Palestinian guerrillas, released by
the West Germans after other guerrillas hijacked a Lufthansa jetliner. The three guerrillas had
participated in the killing of the Israeli athletes in Munich. N.Y. Times, October 30, 1972, at 1, col.
1.
6Lebanon, like Syria, has permitted enormous numbers of refugees from Israeli-occupied areas
of Palestine to live in Lebanon for a "temporary" period until their lands are restored to them. Most
importantly, Lebanon-in part of an inability to do otherwise-has allowed these refugee camps to
be the headquarters of various liberation groups such as Al Fatah. These camps serve as the staging
ground for increasingly infrequent military attacks upon Israel and as the training area for the zealot
groups such as the "Black September"-named after the month in 1970, when King Hussein of
Jordan expelled the guerrillas from Jordan where they had been living in a similar arrangement.
After several recent outbreaks of violence between the guerrillas and the government troops of
Lebanese president Suleiman Frankjieh, an uneasy peace'exists and the Palestinian guerrillas retain
their position of respect. The Washington Post, May 11, 1973, at Al, col. 6; id., May 14, 1973, at
A6, col. 3; id., May 18, 1973, at A22, col. 2.
'See A. DALLIN & G. BRESLAUER, POLITICAL TERROR IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS (1970). The
authors detail the use of terror and conclude that it served as a useful tool for motivation where
positive benefits such as material inducements are lacking, noting: "Organized terror now serves to
ensure compliant behavior during ... a period of change, and to this extent, political terror,
however painful or distasteful, has a rational basis." Id. at 7. See also R. CONQUEST, THE GREAT
TERROR: STALIN'S PURGE OF THE THIRTIES (1969).
"The systematic and ritualized use of terror in primitive societies, particularly the Zulu state of
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colonial powers.49 The study of terrorism prepared by the United Nations
Secretariat notes that the term "terrorism" originally applied "mainly to those
acts and policies of Governments which were designed to spread terror among a
population for the purpose of ensuring its submission to and conformity with
the will of those Governments," 50 but concludes that the term is now limited to
the actions of individuals. During the United Nations debates on this subject, a
substantial number of states refused to accept such a narrowing either of the
term or of the activities which the international community should seek to
control.S1 The remarks of Ambassador Farah of Somalia on this point are
illustrative:
The General Assembly must view this question of terrorism with a sense of historical
perspective. While the world organization has a duty to use the peace-keeping
machinery at its disposal to deal with all forms of violence, including international
terrorism, it must be realized that this phenomenon is not new; it has only been
brought closer home because a world which had accepted violence and terror as the
natural lot of the poor, the weak, and the oppressed, is shocked to see these evils
applied to the rich and successful.52
Though these comments may overstate the element of hypocrisy somewhat,
they do emphasize the critical nature of the scope of the terrorism issue. For a
definition of terrorism that casts its net too narrowly will fail of support as surely
as one that casts it too broadly. It should not be forgotten that efforts to secure
acceptance of a Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind 53 have themselves regularly foundered on the rocks of defining
Africa, has been studied exhaustively in E. WALTER, TERROR AND RESISTANCE: A STUDY OF
POLITICAL VIOLENCE (London 1969).4 9The generally accepted view among representatives from former colonies is that colonial and
"settler" regimes (such as Rhodesia, South Africa, and Israel) have a virtual monopoly on "true"
terrorism. This was recently emphasized in remarks by one of the panelists on terrorism at the 1973
meeting of the American Society of International Law, where it was said: "I assume, therefore, at
least for the weak members of the international community-which happens to coincide with its
third world component-that terrorism in international relations, irrespective of how we define ter-
rorism, is largely an attribute of the strong." Address by Professor Ibrahim Abu-Lughod of North-
western University, American Society of International Law, April 12, 1973. See J. JOESTEN, THE
RED HAND: THE SINISTER ACCOUNT OF THE TERRORIST ARM OF THE FRENCH RIGHT WING
"ULTRAS" IN ALGERIA (London 1962); SAYED NoFA, ISRAEL'S CRIME RECORD (Cairo 1965); see
also note 61 infra.
"°Study Prepared by the Secretariat in Accordance with the Decision Taken by the Sixth
Committee at Its 1314th Meeting on September 27, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/418 (November 2,
1972) at 6.
"'See, e.g., the remarks of Ambassador at the General Assembly:
We do not believe that patriotism is served by violence which destroys innocent souls. Yet we
shall not be a party to exploiting an emotional act of desperation in order to block patriotic
activity for liberation and suffocate in its cradle the legitimate struggle of peoples. We are firmly
opposed to the massive terrorism for which Member States of this United Nations are responsible,
as they practice oppression against peoples who are struggling for their freedom, sovereignty,
national dignity, and recovery of their lands.
Compilation of Relevant Views Expressed in the Course of the General Debate at the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.867 (1972) at 121.
"ld. at 141-42.
119 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954). See Mueller, The United Nations
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"aggression." 54 And the issue of controlling terrorism has all the earmarks of
succumbing to the same fate, since the debate over nomenclature and scope of
"terrorism" goes to the ultimate issue of how far international organizations
may involve themselves in "domestic" conflicts, and to the dismal issue of how
competent the United Nations in particular is at resolving "international"
conflicts.
The latter issue dovetails with the first of the possible results of the study of
"causes" mentioned above, 55 in relation to terrorism conducted by Palestinian
guerrillas. Deplorable and inexcusable though the Lod, Munich and Khartoum
murders are, it is not inconceivable that there will be other such incidents so
long as the Palestinian "question" goes unresolved, 56 or worse, goes unnoticed
while some future resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is consummated. 57
The bitter dedication of the Palestinians to their cause, which they perceive as
being ignored by the great powers and betrayed by some of the Arab states is
immune to pity, immune to deterrence. So dedicated are the Palestinians, the
Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: An American Evaluation, in
INT'L CRIM. L. 597 (Mueller & Wise, ed. 1965).
"In 1957, the General Assembly deferred consideration of the question of the draft code until it
again considered the question of defining aggression, which was a significant element in many of the
offenses within the draft code which was directed primarily at authorities of States. At the 23rd
session of the General Assembly in 1968, the question was again raised and deferred pending some
agreement on a definition of aggression. 23 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 87, U.N. Doc.
A/BUR/171 (1968); id., U.N. Doc. A/7250 (1968). See generally Ferencz, Defining Aggression:
Where it Stands and Where It's Going. 66 AM. J. INT'L. L. 491 (1972).
"G.A. Res. A/3034. See note 26 supra.
"Shortly after the Khartoum murders, a Beirut newspaper with close ties to the Palestinians,
carried a story quoting a Black September spokesman as follows: "This operation will teach the
world to take our words seriously. We will not be double-crossed again or allow our demands to be
the subject of bargaining." The Washington Post, March 14,1973, at A21, col. 1. What they want, it
should be remembered, is their land back from the Israelis-not just the right to live in Israel
unmolested, but to have their own Palestinian state returned in the same condition it was before the
Zionists "stole" it in 1947. Objective observers of the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian "conflict" have
charitably described this incredibly involved legal,' moral and emotional problem as both a battle of
"rights versus rights" and, alternatively, "wrongs versus wrongs." The limbo of this problem has
been described also in these words:
Whatever the rights of the Israelis, Arabs once possessed Palestine. Whatever the rights of the
Arabs, Israelis now possess it. Instead of ghettos, these camps. Instead of an identity, a
diaspora .... But any new state for them would have to be at Jordan's or Israel's expense. The
subject revolves, like history itself, looking for a solution, for a moral. The refugees remain where
they are.
D. PRYCE-JONEs, THE FACE OF DEFEAT: PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS AND REFUGEES (1972) at 164.
For more rigorous analyses of the legal issues involved, see Peretz, Arab Palestine: Phoenix or
Phantom? 48 FOR. AFF. 322 (1970). Compare Bassiouni, The "Middle East": The Misunderstood
Conflict, 19 KAN. L. REV. 373 (1971) and Bassiouni, Self-Determination and the Palestinians, 65
AM. J. INT'L. L. 31 (1971) with Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Obligation to Pursue
Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 19 KAN. L. REV. 403 (1971) and Green,
Self-Determination and Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1971). See
generally Nanda, Self Determination in InternationalLaw, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 321 (1972).
"7The Palestinians-with good cause-are concerned about being ignored in any ultimate
settlement of the current dispute between the Arabs and the Israelis, and it is this fear which directly
relates to the displays of terrorism which the Palestinians have used to keep themselves before the
world's eyes. The Washington Post, March 14, 1973, at A21, col. 1; id., May 17, 1973, at F2, col. 1.
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argument goes, there can be no respite from the cycle of terrorism and
retaliation5 8 until the political questions are settled. This argument was
articulated during the General Assembly in a particularly forceful manner by
Ambassador Lopes of the Congo:
We cannot separate [the Palestinians'] actions from the circumstances that have
engendered them. They were born in conditions that we have made favorable by
ignoring their rights, by dissociating ourselves from their fate, and by throwing them
into a ghetto like the dregs of humanity. If the Europeans of 1972 no longer blow up
trains and bridges [like the Resistance], it is because their countries are free.
Palestinians in a Palestine regained will go to the Olympic games, not to take hostages
but to compete with other nations in the stadium, just as Palestinians in a Palestine
regained will no longer have any reason to hijack aircraft.59
Whether one chooses to agree with the Palestinians' cause or not is immaterial
to an understanding of this influential perspective on the terrorism issue. What
matters is that all states concerned about the terrible effects of Palestinian
terrorism, must recognize that these acts cannot be dismissed simply as odious
"common crimes."
In the present circumstances, they are acts of communication which are too
costly and brutal to permit in the future, but which are also too important to
ignore. 60 They are as directly related to the Mideast conflict as any other
outbreak of armed violence that has occurred in that arena, and should serve
as a goad to achieving a peaceful solution of the entire problem, rather than as
an excuse to sanction the Palestinian "question" out of existence.
Similarly, it is argued, terrorist acts by guerrilla movements in other parts of
the world, should be recognized not as a merely vicious abuse of international
lines of communication and diplomacy, but rather as an anguished outcry by
patriots who are themselves abused by governmental repression which violates
the most sacred standards of human conduct.
Pointing to studies of the systematic use of torture by certain regimes in Latin
America, Africa and Asia, 61 to reports of wide-scale violations of human rights
5
:'See note 38 supra.
'Compilation of Relevant Views Expressed in the Course of the General Debate at the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.867 at 51.
"Trhe study prepared by the Secretariat on the terrorism issue points out:
A terrorist act focuses world attention upon the terrorist and upon any cause he may claim to
represent. In these circumstances, some such acts-which . . . cannot possibly by themselves
effect radical social changes-are really acts of communication.
Study Prepared by the Secretariat in Accordance With the Decision Taken by the Sixth Committee
at Its 1314th Meeting on September 27, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.418 (1972) at 9. The frustration
of the Palestinians who perceive themselves as unjustly victimized by the Israelis is understandable,
but there seems to be no hope in sight for a resolution of the controversy in the near future. See
Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council Resolution 331 of April 20, 1973. U.N.
Doc. S/10929 (1973) (giving a full account of the efforts of the United Nations to resolve the Mideast
crisis since the Six-Day War in June 1967).
"'At a panel in New York City, officials of Amnesty International charged that the use of torture
by governments against political prisoners was growing, and has reached "epidemic" proportions.
They concluded, from evidence gathered throughout the world, that at least 60 governments were
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in Israeli-occupied territory, 62 and to the continued existence of remorseless
and unremitting racism in Rhodesia and South Africa, many states have
suggested that it is the coldest and most self-serving sort of cynicism for the
United States to inveigh against "exporting" terrorism, 63 while ignoring
equally reprehensible acts of home-grown, official "terrorism." 64 The viewpoint
of these states can be gleaned from the comments of Ambassador al-Khalifah of
Bahrain on the floor of the General Assembly:
It is not our intention to condone terrorism or acts of violence, which are alien to our
history, civilization and culture. But while studying the underlying causes, we should
avoid applying double standards and not allow this item to be used as a means of
undermining liberation movements, challenging basic human rights, or exonerating
from blame those States which, by their disregard of political and human rights, have
driven some people to despair.65
Once again, to understand this perspective on the terrorism issue, one need
not accept the assertions of violations of human rights as true. If they are true,
then it would seem to be only elementary justice for the United Nations to strive
to establish some effective means of peaceful redress when all legitimate internal
means fail. None of the nations that have spoken to this issue have sought to
hold a brief for terrorism itself; although a pragmatist might acknowledge the
undoubted effectiveness of terrorism in contributing towards revolutionary
political change66 and an ideologue might accept the myopic thesis that the end
using terror, including the governments of Argentina, Greece, South Africa, South Vietnam and the
Soviet Union. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1973, at 3, col. 1. See also The Washington Post, May 11, 1973,
at A28, col. 1 (citing examples of torture in Mexico).
"
2Ambassador Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, the Chairman of the Special Committee on Israeli
Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, made these
comments on the floor of the General Assembly:
I have been deeply disturbed by the attitude of many Members of this organization when the
reports of the Special Committee are considered, Members who think it fair and proper to abstain
on resolutions protesting against unmistakable and proven violations of the human rights of the
populations of the occupied territories, but find themselves suddenly roused out of their torpor by
the senseless savagery of Munich and Lod Airport. Had this Organization acted in a responsible
manner, Munich and Lod would not have stained the pages of contemporary history.
Compilation of Relevant Views Expressed in the Course of the General Debate at the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.867 (1972) at 133. Compare Meguid, Israeli Practices and Human
Rights in Occupied Arab Territories, 7 INT'L. LAw. 279 (1973) with Grunis, The United Nations
and Human Rights in the Israel Occupied Territories, 7 INT'L LAW. 271 (1973).
"John Norton Moore, the author of the United States draft convention on terrorism, see note 18
supra, has described its function as follows: "the Convention focuses on the common interest of all
nations in preventing the spread of violence from countries involved in civil or international conflict
to countries not a party to such conflict." Address by John Norton Moore, American Society of
International Law meeting, April 12, 1973. The clear intent is not to peer behind the domestic
violence at all. Whether such a view is correct or not is, of course, arguable.
"The United States, for example, abstained in the recent Security Council vote censuring Israel
for its brutal, illegal attack on the apartment of guerrilla leaders in Beirut. See note 38 supra.
"Compilation of Relevant Views Expressed in the Course of the General Debate at the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.867 (1972) at 65.
""Terror was employed tactically in 50 of 61 insurrections [between 1907 and 19471 analyzed.
... Perhaps terror is most popular as a weapon of nationalist revolutionaries .... The terrorist in
nationalist struggles often becomes glorified as a hero or martyr." H. CHISHOLM, THE FUNCTION OF
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justifies the means. 67
The fears expressed by the United States and others notwithstanding, 68 there
appears to be an astonishingly universal acceptance of the notion that all is not
fair in love and war-that certain tactics, even in pursuit of the most honorable
goals, are unacceptable. But what the United States seems to have
misunderstood is that a majority of the nations of the world insist that this
universal normative value actually be made universal, and be applied
evenhandedly if it is to be applied at all. To these states, it is as important that
fair means be exacted from all parties to armed conflicts-domestic or
international-both those resisting wars of national liberation as well as those
waging them.
This goal is a difficult one to reach, and the mechanism by which to
accomplish it is as yet not readily at hand. But it is likely that it will not be the
sort of constricted, seemingly one-sided convention proposed by the United
States in the United Nations last September. Ultimately perhaps, the United
Nations should strive toward a broad-spectrum convention on human rights,
defining specific crimes of international significance such as the Draft Code of
Offenses, 6 9 enforceable against both individuals and governments in an
International Criminal Court, such as that proposed by a special United Nations
committee in 195170 or the one devised to accompany the Terrorism
TERROR AND VIOLENCE IN REVOLUTION (1948) (unpublished thesis in Library of Congress). While
noting that merely indiscriminate terror is counter-productive, several analysts have recognized
that selective terrorism can disrupt governmental control over the citizenry, cause citizens to lose
confidence in the government, publicize the cause, and, if aimed at despised elements of society,
cause the terrorists to appear as liberators. See A. Molnar et al., Human Factors Considerations in
Undergrounds in Insurgencies (D.A. Pamphlet 1966) at 169 et seq.; Silverman & Jackson, Terror in
Insurgency Warfare. 50 MILITARY REV. 61 (1971); Thornton, Terror as a Weapon of Political
Agitation, in INTERNAL WAR 81 (Eckstein, ed. 1964).
"See L. TROTSKY, THE DEFENSE OF TERuomisM (1961). Trotsky points out in this seminal
essay:
A victorious army generally destroys only an insignificant part of the conquered army,
intimidating the remainder and breaking their will. The revolution works in the same way: it kills
individuals and intimidates thousands.
Id. at 63.
6 he comments of the United States and other nations, after the vote on G.A. Res. 3034, were
extremely pessimistic and ominous. The statement of Ambassador Longerstaey of Belgium is
characteristic:
What the co-sponsors of the draft resolution just adopted wanted was to take a step backwards,
to abandon principles acknowledged many times by the United Nations family. They wanted to
abrogate the prohibition against the taking of hostages, acts of violence intentionally carried out
against civilians who take no part in existing conflicts; they wanted to prevent condemnation of
the export of such actions to the territories of third countries.
U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2114 (1972) at 145.
"Though the draft code is presently limited to the acts of governmental authorities, see note 53
supra, as the study prepared by the Secretariat points out, there is no necessity to limit a code of
international crime to these sorts of individuals. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/418 (1972) at 26.
10Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the Committee on International
Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 48/4 (1951), reprinted in 46 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp.1
(1952). For critical discussions of the numerous problems raised by scholars regarding domestic
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Convention of 1937.71
More modestly, it might be wiser to move towards bringing guerrilla activities
under international conventions on the laws of war-both for protections and
for controls. 72 Only by convincing the revolutionary movements of the present
day to limit their tactics to "acceptable" ones will the terrorist threat pass away
from innocent persons, but this will never occur unless the international
community convinces or coerces the target governments to abide by the laws of
warfare, the Geneva 73 and Hague 74 conventions, Articles 2(4) and 51 of the
United Nations Charter. 75
The potential success of such efforts can only be speculated on, but it is clear
that the current initiatives of the United States can never receive enough
constitutionality, authority and power over states, selection of prosecutors, execution of sentences,
appellate review, substantive jurisdiction, and penalties as well as issues of how it would be set up
and funded, see Wright, Proposal for an International Criminal Court, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 60
(1952); Liang, Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United Nations, id. at 89; Klein & Wilkes,
United Nations Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court : An American Evaluation, in
INT'L CRIM. L. 526 (Mueller & Wise, ed. 1965); Bridge, The Case for an International Criminal
Court and the Formulation of International Criminal Law, 13 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 1255 (1964);
Wilkes, Courts ofInternational CriminalJurisdiction, in WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW 792 (1967);
Sundberg, The Case for an International Criminal Court, 37 J. AIR L. & Comm. 211 (1971); Golt,
The Necessity of an International Court of Criminal Justice, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 13 (1966). One
obvious and enormous advantage of enforcing an international anti-terrorism convention through
an international court would be the opportunity to "break" the political cycle by resorting to neutral
judges. This could well be a useful alternative to "host" states, of terrorists who certainly don't want
to return "allies" to a hostile victim nation, and who may be reluctant to prosecute the terrorists
domestically for local political reasons.
"See note 40 supra. Many of the articles listed in note 70 supra also discuss the international
court proposed in the 1937 Convention.
"Ultimately, it is arguable whether the nations of the world truly desire to regulate themselves
through international mechanisms, but the advantage of attempting to bring guerrillas under the
laws of war is that there is a quid pro quo here where there was none for the guerrillas in the United
States approach. See Lawrence, The Status under International Law of Recent Guerrilla
Movements in Latin America, 7 INT'L LAW. 405 (1973); Schwarzenberger, Terrorists, Guerrilleros
and Mercenaries, 1971 TOLEDO L. REV. 71. In 1972, the International Commission of the Red
Cross submitted a draft article to the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law which would have accorded guerrilla forces the
protection of the Geneva Conventions. There was substantial debate over the desirability and
effectiveness of such a provision, and no conclusion was reached by this conference. Report of the
Secretary-General, Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doe. A/8781 (1972) at 55-57, 86-87.
The General Assembly voted to place the general subject of human rights in armed conflicts on the
agenda for the 28th session and urged governments to work with the Swiss Federal Council, which is
the depository of the Geneva Conventions, in setting up and successfully concluding a diplomatic
conference on the subject. G.A. Res. 3032 (XXVII) (January 23, 1973).
"There are four Geneva Conventions of relevance here: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature
August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. 3362; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, id. 85, 3217, 3363; Geneva Convention for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, id. 135, 3316,
3364; Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, id. 287, 3516, 3365.
7
'Hague Convention IV of 1907, Annex to the Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277. See Baxter, So-called "Unprivileged Belligerents," Spies,
Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 1951 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 323.
"See generally Franck, Who Killed Article 2 (4)?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
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support to become effective. For as long as there are revolutionary movements,
struggling against what some may consider injustice, there will in the present
world be nations which will support such movements and provide assistance and
asylum to their members.
As the current debate on terrorism progresses at the United Nations,
therefore, it would not be inane to suggest that the members of the United
States delegation take time to view a new motion picture by writer-director
Costa-Gavras, entitled State of Siege, which they might usefully juxtapose with
their past experiences, thereby gaining an additional perspective on the pathetic
issue of terrorism. Rightly or wrongly, though Art may indeed mirror Reality,
when it comes to legal matters the former seems seldom in the past to have
influenced the latter.
For all the bitter parody of its interminable lawsuits, Bleak House 76 did
nothing to improve probate litigation in Victorian England; nor has Albert
Camus' metaphysical dissection of proof in The Stranger77 found its way into
evidentiary treatises. Yet, in an age when science and logic have left universal
answers to ultimate questions as elusive as ever, fiction may sometimes move a
person to understanding more effectively than mere scholarly musings or
white-papered reports.
In his film, Costa-Gavras takes the factual framework of an actual
occurrence-the kidnapping and murder of an American A.I.D. official by
Tupamaros guerrillas in Uruguay in 1970 78 -and elucidates the moral
dilemma that lies at the very heart of the issue of political terrorism.
Costa-Gavras the artist interposes the point of view of the terrorists-who have
been hunted, imprisoned and brutalized for trying to achieve reforms through
democratic means-between the audience and its normal object of sympathy,
the victim.
Costa-Gavras shows us ordinary, just men turned into rebels because of their
treatment at the hands of unjust, venal tyrants. Faced with such a ruthless foe,
the would-be reformer comes finally to his own crisis of conscience: the
anguished and irreversible choice between giving up his worthy ends or resorting
to unworthy means. Confronted by such a savage Hobson's choice, who is to say
which is the better, which the worse?
This is the dilemma. To many of the Third World nations, it is a real one, and
in calling attention to it they have repudiated the short-sighted efforts of the
United States to forge an international convention whose only real effect would
have been to foreclose one horn of the dilemma, while leaving the luckless
716C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE
"A. CAMUS, THE STRANGER.
rFhe guerrillas demanded the release of 150 prisoners who were apparently not "political"
prisoners as such in return for the life of Dan A. Mitrione, an advisor of the Uruguay police forces.
When the government rejected the demand, Mitrione was shot. U.S. NEwS & WORLD REPORT,
August 24, 1970, at 22.
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reformer still impaled on the other. The irony of this prospect would not have
been lost on Jean Valjean.
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